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Abstract 
The introduction of a congestion tax was a significant moment in the management of mobility in 
Stockholm. After several decades of lobbying and political conflict, the tax was introduced as a trial 2006, 
consented to by citizens through a referendum, and then adopted permanently in the summer 2007. 
Consensus on addressing the problems caused by the car in the city appeared to have been reached, and 
the final scheme was introduced to international acclaim.  
 
This paper critically examines this apparent consensus on confronting car based mobility by analysing 
how mobility was framed at key stages in policy making since the 1970s through to the trial in 2006 and 
subsequent implementation.  
 
The analysis centres on the place of the car in successive framings of mobility. Changing targets and 
objectives for urban traffic management are compared, and an attempt is made to trace winners and losers 
in relation to motility and environmental quality. Overall the paper attempts to show how congestion 
taxation was framed and reframed to produce dramatically different possible mobility interventions. This 
analysis is used to argue that the framing of future mobility changed fundamentally by the time the final 
scheme was adopted, and that a moment of ambivalence about the car, during the trial, was not used to 
confront car based mobility. Instead a persuasive story of successful implementation has allowed a new 
car oriented mobility regime to slip into place under the veil of a progressive policy intervention.  
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1. Introduction 
One of the most difficult issues to be faced in urban strategy making concerns the consequences of rapidly 
increasing personal mobility, in the form of private car use. Congestion, pollution, accidents and other 
problems related to private motorism has been on the planners and decision makers’ agendas for years – 
but always proved difficult to turn into long lasting schemes for implementation. In the city of Stockholm, 
the discussion about how to “solve” the problems related to private car use have been going on for more 
than four decades. However, agreements have often failed. Therefore, the introduction of a congestion tax 
was a significant moment in the management of mobility in Stockholm. After several decades of lobbying 
and political conflict, the tax was introduced as a trial 2006, consented to by citizens through a 
referendum, and then adopted permanently in the summer 2007, to international acclaim. Except from a 
few remaining opponents like the chamber of commerce, there is now an apparent unity  on congestion 
taxation as an effective measure for addressing the problems caused by the car in the city.  
This paper explores this apparent consensus on confronting car based mobility by analysing how mobility 
was framed at key stages in planning and policy making on transportation infrastructure and mobility 
management since the 1970s, including the proposed “district charge” in the 1980s, the Dennis Package in 
the early 1990s, through to the trial in 2006 and the current scheme from August 2007 and onwards. The 
aim of this paper is to critically examine the place of the car in successive framings of mobility manifested 
in policy schemes to deal with congestion and other traffic-related problems in the city of Stockholm from 
the 1970s up till now. The analysis focus on changing targets and objectives for urban traffic management, 
and also power-relations embedded in each scheme, which we explore through the tracing of winners and 
losers in relation to motility and environmental quality.  
Measures to control the car, such as congestion taxation, are at the leading edge of what has been termed a 
sustainable transport paradigm (Banister, 2008). This paper, however, begins with the concern that even 
such flagship policies for urban traffic management are often ambivalent about tackling car dependence. 
This despite the mounting evidence that current trends are resulting in damaging and increasingly 
unacceptable environmental and social burdens. Apart from certain significant experiments, most urban 
strategy making fails to seriously address these concerns. Counter-intuitively, even policies with the 
strongest potential to control car use, and here we concentrate on urban congestion charging, have not 
been designed to achieve environmental gains, and the more radical possibilities of these interventions are 
often weakened during implementation (Banister, 2003).  
At a time when the future direction of strategic management of mobility is unclear, and where serious 
moral and political questions exist about whether and how radical measures to control car use can or 
should be introduced in different settings, it becomes important to examine closely the ways in which such 
controversial frames surface within strategy making processes, and how they are promoted, resisted, 
reshaped and ultimately institutionalized or silenced. 
This paper pursues this line of inquiry, focusing explicitly on the dominant frames of mobility in policy 
making in Stockholm over a period of four decades. Focusing on policy debates on policy measures for 
congestion reduction, we explore how the different frames of mobility opened up new possibilities for 
action in this complex urban governance setting. Central to the analysis is the question of how actors 
sought to make the difficult choices and trade-offs implicit in seeking to manage urban mobility. We 
reflect on the potential consequences of different framings in terms of the associated patterns of mobility, 
motility (i.e “mobility potential”, see further below) and environmental qualities. Thus what is in focus is 
how the narrative of personal mobility by the private car shifted in successive dominant frames. We also 
seek to show how particular power-relations, at different times, played a part in the production of each 
frame. Overall, we attempt to trace how the successive debates over congestion taxation managed difficult 
questions about future urban mobility, and how the role of the car was treated in this. 
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We continue by explaining in a little more detail how we understand ‘framing’ of mobility, and 
introducing our analytical approach. This is followed by an analysis of frames of mobility, from early 
political debates about how to control access by car to the city of Stockholm in the 1970s and 1980s, to the 
Dennis Package in the 1990s, the congestion tax trial in 2006 and the adopted congestion tax scheme in 
2007. This leads to a discussion of how controversial and contested aspects of urban mobility, in particular 
the role of the private car, were managed over time.  
2. Framing mobilities 
One way of exploring the role of the car in personal mobility, is to focus on how mobiliy – and especially 
future mobility – is framed at particular times and in particular governance settings. Governing mobility, 
through the planning and management of urban development and transport systems, involves the routine 
creation of ideas, concepts, and language, that together form a narrative of a new potential for mobility. A 
new potential future is offered, that will, according to the underlying logic of the narrative, lead to certain 
changes in mobility, for certain people and in certain places. Spatial plans and strategies, policies and 
physical measures, are conduits of such narratives, as well as arenas for their contestation. These 
narratives contain frames, which can be understood analytically as a coming together of a particular 
language of mobility, grounded in an underlying logic, or rationality, and applied in a certain context. The 
frame contains a problem to be solved, a course of action to be followed, a more or less reasoned 
justification for this, and a consideration of the consequences of doing so (Lautrup Nielsen and 
Gyldenlund Råby 2008). Analysing frames allows identification of these elements. By analysing how a 
single policy issue, policy measures to combat traffic congestion, was framed and reframed at different 
key moments in policy making over several decades, it becomes possible to trace the shifting nature of the 
problems, justifications, and consequences, and underlying logics that formed the policy narrative. This 
allows us to analyse how the congestion tax, in its different dominant formulations over time, engaged 
with personal mobility by private car.  
Policy-makers, planners and other actors who act strategically to manage mobility do so partly by 
populating their imagined urban transport systems with imagined mobile citizens. This practice - the 
production of imagined mobile subjects - allows potentially persuasive stories to be crafted about 
sustainable and just future mobilities, assuming that a range of specified spatial interventions are carried 
out (ibid.). It becomes interesting, then, to analyse how certain forms of movement, for certain citizens, 
are put at the centre of policy. Here, we work on the basis that mobility is unequal, and that the framing of 
movement, as part of the process of managing mobility, is therefore an important locus of power 
struggles:  
‘Access to and control over physical movement is unequally distributed. 
However, so is access to and control over assessing which activities can 
meaningfully be given the label ‘movement’ in the first place. Understanding 
movement in this way leads us to ask how various activities are given the status 
of  ‘movement’, as well as how they are given meaning and importance, by 
whom and with what consequences’. (Frello 2008: 25). 
This approach leads to a focus on the existence of winners and losers in all mobility frames. Identification 
of winners and losers might for example relate to the distribution of “mobility potential” – motility – 
among different groups of travellers or inhabitants in a city or region. Motility has been defined by 
Kaufmann as “the way in which an individual appropriates what is possible in the domain of mobility and 
puts this potential to use for his or her activities” (Kaufmann 2002:37, cited in Urry 2007:38). 
Determinants for the mobility of people are things like “physical aptitude, aspirations, accessibility to 
transportation and communications, space-time constraints, knowledge, licenses” (ibid). Also policy 
measures might be added on to this list as one factor that increases or enhance the mobility and motility 
for different persons and groups of travellers. There is thus a question of for whom, and on whose behalf, 
certain mobilities or motilities are supported (or not!) as part of mobility framings in policy measures.  
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It has been stated that “almost all mobilities presuppose large-scale immobile infrastructures [including] 
paths, railway tracks, public roads, […] pylons, sewerage systems, gas pipes, […] and so on” (Urry 
2007:19 referring to Graham and Marvin 2001, Sheller and Urry 2006). These infrastructures does not 
only result in enforced fixity and coerced movement (Urry 2007:37 referring to Ray 2002), but of course 
also environmental, economic and social (etc) consequences on affected places and for mobile or 
immobile subjects. Therefore, an analysis of winners and losers should also take on board the distribution 
of possible and negative environmental consequences among residents and mobile subjects in affected 
areas. The analysis thereby takes the environmental justice framework (see e.g. Agyeman, 2005; Bullard, 
2000; Hofrichter, 1993) as a point of departure. This leads us to the following questions which shape the 
analysis of each of the dominant frames, with its associated strategy for mobility management: 
• What is the main objective of each mobility management strategy from 1970s and onwards? 
• Who are the future “key mobile subjects” referred to in each mobility management strategy: whose 
mobility is put at stake? 
• How do the measures aim to change mobility practices of these mobile subjects, and with what 
justifications? 
• Who are the winners and losers in each mobility management strategy – in terms of mobility, 
motility and environmental qualities? 
• How “radical” is each measure in terms of confronting car-based automobility? 
 
Through the analysis of the successive frames we seek to establish the existence of continuities and 
discontinuities in the framing of mobilities. We aim to reveal whether a thread of policy rationality 
continues, or whether different logics prevail over time.  
3. Successive framings of mobility in Stockholm 
3.1 1970’s consensus on reducing car based-mobility by 20% 
The late 1960s and early 1970s were years of growing criticism against increasing motorism and related 
schemes for investments in road infrastructure in Stockholm. In the late 1970s, the political parties in 
Stockholm agreed to reduce car use in the inner city with 20 percent, mainly as a consequence of new 
evolving standards for air quality. In the end, the parties failed to agree on the concrete policy measures 
(Gullberg and Isaksson 2008),1 But in general, a combination of several measures was being discussed – 
such as restrictive parking policies, possible road pricing schemes and even prohibited entrance to the city 
by car. Worth to note is also that plans for extensive new road investments, which had been prepared in 
the 1950s and 1960s2 were abandoned and the discussion was now more focused on measures to make 
more people chose public transportation (Gullberg (ed) 1998, Isaksson 2001). Both right-wing and left 
wing parties were open to congestion charging of some sort3 but the idea did not develop into any concrete 
proposal at the time. (Gullberg and Isaksson 2008).  
As a result of a general economic decline and less people moving to Stockholm, car-use decreased 
spontaneously at the beginning of the 1970s (Skårfors 2001). Ironically, this meant that the discussion 
about measures to reduce car-use in the city eventually ran out of steam. When the 1970s eventually 
changed to 1980s, there was no longer any strong political will or momentum to go on with the measures 
to reduce car-based mobility (ibid. C.f. Tengström 1990.). One measure that was implemented in the 
                                                 
1
 The left party, the centre party and the stockholm party even argued for a 50 percent reduction (see Gullberg and 
Isaksson 2008).  
2
 One example is “Traffic route-plan 1960” which suggested a full ring road around the city of Stockholm, see 
Gullberg (ed) 1998, Isaksson 2001, p 5).  
3
 With one exception: the left party was against congestion charging at this time because of distributive justice-
aspects, but was supporting other means to reduce motorism.  
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1970s was however regulation of traffic in different parts of the inner city, where thoroughfare was 
banned – except on a few main roads. This evocated mixed reactions and motorist protests led to some 
mitigation. The result was some improvement in the local traffic situation but the influence on total traffic 
volume was small and more of an increase than the other way around. 
The most distinctive feature of the mobility framing in the 1970s is that is actually was based upon a 
mutual understanding of the car as a problem for the city. Thus, there was a consensus on reducing 
motorism, as a means to improve the environmental quality in the inner city. At the time, environmental 
issues – like air pollution and noise – were main targets, but also congestion (Gullberg and Isaksson 
2008). The mobile subjects in focus were car-drivers, especially those who used the car in the inner-city 
(ibid.).There was not any strong focus on other mobile subjects, like pedestrians and cyclists, but public 
transportation was one alternative transportation mode that was explicitly referred to. The motorists were 
the key mobile subjects in focus, as the ones to change behaviour. And it was when the discussions came 
close to the more specific means to make people change behaviour that the political controversies started 
to show. So in spite of a political majority supporting the decision to abandon massive road investments 
planned in the 1950s and 1960s, the 1970s did not see a turn towards policy measures specifically 
designed to change mobility practices.  
3.2 District charges in the 1980s  
The 1980’s was a decade of economic recovery, and car-ownership increased – as did the amount of car-
travels in total4. Thus traffic and congestion escalated in Stockholm (Isaksson 2001). In the second half of 
the 1980s, there was a reborn interest for environmental issues in Sweden, and the living conditions in 
main city areas was a central theme in the public debate – not the least in relation to private motorism and 
the negative consequences for health and environment (ibid). In their role as an opposition party, the 
social democrats in the city of Stockholm designed a proposal according to which Stockholm motorists 
would have to buy a SL-card (=card that allows a person to go by public transportation in the whole 
county of Stockholm) and put in the front window of the car when driving in the inner city. In the end of 
the 1980s, this idea of “district charges” was launched by the then leading coalition of the Social 
Democratic Party, the Left Party and the Stockholm Party5. According to the proposal, the revenues 
should go to investments in public transportation.  
The district charge proposal was contested, not the least for legislative reasons.6 Critical voices were being 
raised from parties from the right, who were strongly against any idea to try to steer traffic in line with the 
proposal. However, they did not show so much of resistance to road tolls to finance new roads. But the 
idea was challenged also within the Social Democratic Party, and in the end, the proposal was never 
implemented, which later on has been explained in terms of internal ambivalence towards the idea. In 
addition, legislative concerns were being raised and there was also a strong lobbying against the proposal 
from motorist organisations (ibid.).7  
One main target of the “district charges” from the 1980s was, in a similar way as the decade before, to 
improve the urban environment and reduce the negative effects caused by car mobility. In addition to this, 
however, was also the idea to indirectly collect more money for public transportation, by demanding the 
motorists to buy a SL-card. The idea was thus clearly addressing private motorists as a problem and the 
                                                 
4
 Worth to note is perhaps that the early years of the 1980s was a period of time when car-lobbying grew strong. See 
Falkemark and Westdahl 1991 and Tengström 1990. 
5
 The district charge was in essence the very fundament for this coalition, since it was the main demand from the 
Stockholm party, i.e. their provision for cooperation with the other two parties.  
6
 According to a majority of Swedish lawyers, the district charge was in essence a tax, which resulted in a number of 
legislative complications, not the least since it is only the national parliament (riksdagen) that has the authority to 
take tax decisions. See Gullberg and Isaksson 2008 for a full explanation.  
7
 The result of this was eventually also a rift of the local coalition between the Social Democratic Party, the Left 
Party and the Stockholm Party.  
Trafikdage på Aalborg Universitet 2008                                ISSN 1603-9696                                               5
 6 
ones to change their mobility practice. The motorists would be forced to support public transportation 
financially (by buying the SL-card) to be able to drive in the inner city. Thus, implicit in the design of the 
district charge was also the idea that once a person owns the SL-card, he or she might be more open to 
choose public transportation. The district charge can thus be seen as a mobility management measure that 
clearly attempts to change mobility patterns in a way that means a prioritisation of public transportation 
instead of private motorism.  
The winners in the proposed scheme would be those traveller groups who prefer public transportation 
instead of going by car. Since the scheme would generate more funding for public transportation, it would 
also be a way to improve the public transportation system and improved motility also for persons without 
a car. Residents in the inner city, who would benefit from a cleaner environment with less car auto 
mobility in the city can be seen as another group of winners, as well as motorists finding it worth paying 
for a smoother mobility. However, since the scheme was never agreed on nor implemented, these 
potentially new relations between mobile subjects in the urban landscape did not come into force.  
3.3 1990s: road tolls for new road investments in the Dennis package 
The idea to charge motorists for using certain roads recurred in the 1990’s, as part of the “Dennis 
package” that was a large scheme for infrastructure investments in the city and region of Stockholm 
(Isaksson, 2001). The scheme, which consisted of new investments in roads and public transportation, as 
well as the introduction of road tolls, was agreed on by the Social Democratic Party, the Moderate Party 
and the Liberal Party in the city and the region (Isaksson 2001).  
The main objectives with the Dennis package were to improve the environmental quality, improve 
accessibility and strengthen the development of the region of Stockholm (Swedish Government 1990). 
The main part of the Dennis package, at least in budget terms, was a revival of the extensive infrastructure 
plans from the 1950s and 1960s – i.e.the construction of a ring road and an outer bypass (ibid.). Different 
kinds of charges were discussed in the political negotiation surrounding the design of the scheme. The 
idea that finally prevailed was that the road toll revenues would only be used to finance new road 
investments.8 One of the expected results of the proposed measures in the Dennis package was a reduction 
of car-use in the inner city with 25-30%. This should be seen in relation to the expected increase in car-use 
in the larger Stockholm region with 5-20% until 2005 (Länsstyrelsen i Stockholms län 1993:43).  
The road tolls in the Dennis package were much contested. Certain actors, like transport economists, 
questioned the steering effects of the scheme, and argued that if people would have to pay for using the 
new roads, perhaps they would still prefer to drive through the inner city, which was not at all an intended 
outcome. Also environmental interest organisations, questioned the idea to finance new motorways with 
road tolls and were in general very negative to the plans to construct these new roads which they 
interpreted as a massive support of motorism (Isaksson 2001). The Dennis package was stopped in 1997, 
and thus the idea to introduce road tolls was abandoned, as well as the plans to construct the most costly of 
the new roads.  
The target with the policy measures suggested in the Dennis package was something different than the 
measures discussed in the 1970s and 1980s. In the Dennis package, the idea was not at all to reduce 
motorism per se, but instead about managing automobility in a “more efficient” manner, by making car 
users drive around or bypassing the city while simultaneously collecting money for new large scale road 
investments. It was thus not at all an issue about questioning car-based mobility– quite the contrary: a 
certain amount of car traffic was needed to pay for the new roads.  
                                                 
8
 There were also investments in both roads and public transportation that would be paid by the state and the 
municipalities in the greater Stockholm region. But the most costly new roads were to be paid for by road toll 
revenues. 
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The winners in the Dennis package was the motorists who found it worth to pay and also could afford the 
new road tolls, and thus did not at all have to change behaviour. Other winners were people living in the 
inner city where the main environmental benefits, like better air quality, were expected. Losers were those 
who could not afford to pay for getting a better accessibility by car, whose motility would decrease, but 
also those who were living in areas affected by new roads and increased traffic but were themselves not 
motorists, and thus not benefiting from the new traffic infrastructure. The Dennis package also included 
investments in public transportation. Still however, it would be doubtful to map out people using public 
transportation as winners in general of the scheme– in most cases it was more a question if slightly 
increased capacity and necessary renovations, with the new tram line connecting some of the near suburbs 
as an exception. 
3.4 The congestion tax trial January – July 2006 
The failed Dennis package was widely interpreted as an end to the idea to add new charges on car use in 
the city – at least in the foreseeable future. But a highly unexpected result of the election 2002 opened up a 
window of opportunity for the Green Party to push congestion charging into the negotiations with the 
social democrats locally in Stockholm as well as on the national level. The result was a parliament 
decision to implement a full scale congestion charge trial in Stockholm, eventually renamed to the 
congestion tax trial. The trial, which ran from 3 Jan 2006 to 31 July the same year, was a result of 
negotiations between the parties in the coalition governing Stockholm, i.e. the small Green Party, the big 
Social Democratic Party and the small Left Party. The collaboration around the congestion tax trial 
involved deep and difficult political tensions, not the least between the Green Party and the Social 
Democratic Party (see e.g Gullberg and Isaksson 2008, Isaksson and Richardson 2008). In the trial, a tax 
varying between 10 and 20 SEK was put on cars exiting or entering the cordon that surrounded the inner 
city of Stockholm, with an exemption for the main communication link Essingeleden that runs just outside 
the west part of the inner city (www.stockholmsforsoket.se, c.f. Isaksson and Richardson 2008). The trial 
also included increased capacity in the public transportation system, for example a number of extra bus-
lines and more subway-trains running.9 During the trial, tax revenues were earmarked for investments in 
public transportation. 
The formal aim with the congestion tax was to decrease traffic and congestion, enhance accessibility and 
improve the environment.10 The motorists were the key mobile subjects in focus in the scheme – it was 
their travel behaviour that was addressed most clearly. But also the current and future users of public 
transportation were key subjects – both in relation to the increased capacity in the existing system, and 
also in relation to how the revenues would be used.  
 
 
                                                 
9
 Exemption clauses for emergency vehicles, vehicles registered in foreign countries, diplomat cars, military 
vehicles, buses with a weight of minimum 14 tonnages, so called ”environmental vehicles” (according to the rules: 
cars driven by electricity, alcohol, or some other gas than liquefied petroleum gas, taxi cars, transportation service for 
old or disabled (after application), motorcycles, and cars with special permission (for example cars owned by 
physically disabled) (after application). There was also an exemption for vehicles going from or to the municipality 
of Lidingö, which is an island to the east of Stockholm inner city, and who can’t be reached without passing the inner 
city and the congestion tax cordon. Vechicles going from (or to) Lidingö, and who only passed the cordon on its way 
out from the city did not have to pay the tax. More info at www.stockholmsforsoket.se. 
10
 The increased capacity in the system of public transportation was started already 22 of August 2005 and continued 
until the end of December 2006 (www.stockholmsforsoket.se). 
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Figure 1. The congestion tax trial cordon and control points (marked as red dots). 
Source: The Swedish Road Administration 2006. 
 
Even though the congestion tax trial clearly addressed car-users as the ones to change, it did not mean any 
radical change. In essence, the trial expresses a clear ambivalence rather than a challenge towards car-
based mobility. This is manifested for example by the fact that the tax had to be paid by entering the 
cordon around the city whereas there was no tax for cars driving in the inner city, in combination then 
with main communication link Essingeleden not being included in the cordon. In addition, the tax was not 
that high – in the peak hour 20 SEK which is less than 1/5 of the price for entering the congestion charge 
zone in London.11 Also the exemption for so called “environmental cars” is a sign of the ambivalence 
towards private motorism. Thus, the political negotiations around the trial had eventually resulted in a 
scheme that did not in essence challenge motorism. Instead, the main logic was about more cost-effective 
mobility management, where the differentiated tax made travellers use travel mode and timing in relation 
to the tax at each hour of the day.  
One specific group of winners of the congestion tax trial was therefore those who could afford to pay for 
their car-based urban mobility and who also thought that the benefits actually exceeded the cost of paying 
the tax. Among motorists, those living in the inner-city who did not need to pass the cordon had an 
especially privileged position in this scheme, since travel speed and accessibility by car was improved for 
motorists in the inner city during the trial (Transek 2006a). Altogether, most inner city inhabitants were 
benefiting strongly by congestion reduction and improved environmental quality such as less pollution and 
particles in the air (SLB 2006). Also specific lines of business, such as transportation firms, taxi drivers 
etc should be mentioned as winners. They benefited greatly from a generally improved mobility potential: 
in essence they could get more jobs done – to a low cost. Another group of winners was high-consumers 
of public transportation, especially those who lived in areas benefiting from new extra bus-lines or 
                                                 
11
 The congestion charge in London was in 2007 £8 for entering the zone, which at the time corresponded to around 
110 SEK.  
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improved capacity, whose motility also was enhanced. Losers were those living in areas where congestion 
and thus also emissions actually increased (for example in semi-central areas in south-west and south-east, 
just outside the cordon) (ibid.). Evaluation reports have also identified certain professional groups, such as 
bus drivers both in the inner city and in semi-central districts in suburbs to Stockholm suffered from 
higher exposure to NO2-emmissions during the trial than before (Plato, Carlsson, Alderling, Gustavsson 
2006). It is however very uncertain to what extent this is a direct consequence of the congestion tax 
scheme or not. Anyhow, it illustrates the fact that air pollution is a complex matter, and that a general 
picture of emission reductions still might imply increased exposure at specific locations and groups of 
residents or travellers.  
3.5 Congestion taxation supporting new roads: August 2007 and onwards 
The congestion tax trial was closed in the end of July 2006. A local referendum was held in mid-
September, resulting in a small majority for the congestion taxes. Simultaneously however, the public 
election resulted in new political majorities. Thus, a right/liberal government took over both in Stockholm 
and nationally. The situation was complicated: the two main right/liberal parties in the city (i.e. the 
Moderate Party and the Liberal Party) had invested much credibility in opposing the congestion tax trial – 
but the national party organisations had a clearly more ambivalent position, and also the other two parties 
forming majority coalitions (the Centre Party and the Christian Democrats) were positive. In addition, 
there was a proven majority for the congestion tax locally in Stockholm. So how would they go on with 
the issue? 
Soon after the election, the new national government decided that a regular congestion tax would be 
introduced 1 Aug 2007, but with several changes in relation to the trial. For example, the tax was now 
made deductible. The fine for unpaid congestion tax was reduced. The exemption for “environmental 
cars” was limited to five years, and now also taxi cars and transportation service for old and disabled had 
to pay the tax (Swedish government 2007). And, most notably, the tax was now made part of a larger 
infrastructure plan that included large scale investments in new roads and railways in the city and region. 
Instead of using the revenues for investments in public transportation, which had been the case during the 
trial, the money would now be earmarked for “the Stockholm Bypass”, a large road project reaching from 
south-west to north-west in the outskirts of the city region, very similar to parts of the old plans from the 
1950s, 1960s and 1990s (Reinfeldt, Olofsson, Leijonborg, Hägglund 2006). The Stockholm Bypass and 
the congestion tax are today intimately connected in the multi-nodal development strategy for Stockholm 
region (Stockholmsförhandlingen 2007). 
The main targets of the new system for congestion charging is now said to be about improving the 
environment, the accessibility and to contribute financially to new road investments in the Stockholm 
region.12 From these formal aims it is clear that the target this time is not about changing mobility patterns. 
Rather, it is about “effective” mobility management, which in turn is supposed to have positive effects for 
environment and accessibility, and also about funding new infrastructure in itself. 
 
The mobile subjects in focus are again the car-users, who obviously are the ones to change – however not 
necessarily by travelling less but by using the road system in a more efficient way. The regular scheme for 
congestion taxation is currently not connected to any massive efforts for improving public transportation 
in the city or region. This also changes the pattern of winners and losers radically in relation to in the trial. 
Motorists who can afford to pay for their car-based mobility form an even stronger group of winners than 
before; the new regulations for tax deduction have made the price effectively lower. Just as in the trial, 
residents in the inner city, who use the car for travelling within the inner city, are also winners. A new 
group of losers is however appearing – for example people who live in areas where new roads will be 
                                                 
12
 http://www.vv.se/filer/28704/Trangselskatt_foretag_org.pdf, 25 July 2008 
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constructed without benefiting from the new infrastructure, or (like in the trial) those who live in areas 
where congestion actually increases.  
4. Concluding discussion: frame shifts 
The empirical analysis above is a clear illustration of continuous struggles over the place of the car in the 
city. In this final section, based on our analysis of successive framings of urban mobility, we reflect upon 
the overall picture: how have the controversial issues of the place of the car, and of urban mobility in 
general, been managed over time in Stockholm, and who are the winners and losers?  
4.1 A general ambivalence about the role of the car in the city 
There is one striking characteristic coming out from this historical exposé, namely the fundamental 
ambivalence over the place of the car in the city. Over time, private car use is constantly appearing as the 
main problem to tackle, but still only very few of the policy measures described above challenge private 
car use in any radical sense. Motorism was most clearly under attack in the policy debates of the 1970s, 
and to some extent also in the 1980s, but no concrete policy measures were implemented. The Dennis 
package from the 1990s was not at all about challenging the role of the car, quite the contrary. The 
congestion tax trial carried a seed for questioning urban motorism, but in the end it still didn’t do much 
about automobility per se. The main evaluation report states that congestion was noticeably reduced (on 
average 22% reduction on entrance roads to the inner city) (Stockholms stad 2006, p 5). Meanwhile 
however, the total reduction in terms of amount of travels in the region is much less – around 3% – and it 
is not known if there was any loss at all in total travel length (travelled kilometres by car) in the region 
(ibid., p 66). The current system for congestion taxation is even less clearly targeted towards car use in the 
city. It aims for congestion reduction, yes, but is simultaneously serving as a direct financial support for 
the construction of new motorways. In the current congestion tax system, motorism is thus even less 
confronted than before.  
4.2 Mobility norms 
What are then, altogether, the mobility norms being manifested in the different mobility framings traced in 
this article? One main result is of course the eventually increased valorisation of the private car. Public 
transportation were explicitly valorised in the policy measures discussed in the 1970s, 1980s and also 
partly in the trial – but eventually, with the permanent system, it is not treated as an as important system as 
private motorism, only a complement of subordinate importance for the general urban and regional 
development. Mobility in itself is not questioned  in any of the policy measures in focus here – except for 
the very marginal suggestions for entrance prohibition that was part of the policy debate in the 1970s. 
Whereas a number of specific traffic modes has been questioned and challenged, the existing trends and 
tendencies of ever increasing mobility are taken for granted as essentially “good”. Moreover, the idea of 
frictionless mobility is more and more valorised over time, and is now clearly an essential part of the long-
term development strategies for Stockholm. Less mobility is thus not even an issue on the agenda.  
4.3 Winners and losers  
The empirical examples above clearly illustrate how the prevailing support for car-based mobility that is 
manifested through the policy measures result in patterns of uneven distribution of both mobility, motility 
and environmental benefits such as cleaner (or less clean) air, more (or less) noise, safer (or unsafer) 
environments in terms of accidents and generally improved (or reduced) accessibility. As stated above, the 
congestion tax have meant different consequences for different businesses branches and professional 
groups etc. Over time however, the policy measures show a general tendency to benefit motorists who can 
afford (and find it worthwhile) to pay for their car-based mobility, and also residents in the inner city, who 
will benefit from less congestion and improved living environment in several respects. Meanwhile, there 
are new groups of losers– in general people who don’t travel by car but live in areas where new roads will 
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be constructed, or in areas where congestion actually increases in the short or long run due to the 
congestion tax and/or new infrastructure investments and the new patterns of car-based mobility evolving 
in relation to these.  
4.4 Stockholm – a ‘two speed city’ 
The evolving pattern of winners and losers is closely related to the idea of the ‘two speed city’ – a concept 
referring to the idea of a city with two layers of mobility – one layer of smooth, quick and easy mobility, 
and another layer where travelling is slow, with much friction and disruptions. In a ‘two speed city’, 
different groups have different motility potentials depending on for example income, class, technical 
equipment, location etc and the concept also indicate that the motility is unevenly distributed. Of course, 
the ‘two speed city’ has to some extent been part of the situation in Stockholm since the idea of the “car 
city” was established as norm in Swedish city planning (c.f. Lundin 2008). What we can see in the policy 
measures analysed above however, is that this rationality appears stronger and stronger over time in 
Stockholm mobility planning. Also, it seems to be closely connected to an uneven distribution of positive 
and negative environmental consequences of each system. In trial as well as in the the permanent system, 
enhanced mobility and improved environmental quality is a stronger result for inhabitants in the inner city 
than for residents in semi-central or peripheral parts of the region. Thus there are obviously environmental 
injustice aspects of the current congestion tax – especially if the planned infrastructure investments are 
actually implemented – but more research is needed to map out the complex picture more in detail. 
4.5 Stockholm congestion taxation supporting the status quo? 
The analysis carried out in this article has focused on policy measures designed to combat congestion in 
Stockholm from the last four decades. Even though the examples are diverging, and thus all appear as 
specific products of a certain historical, policial and social context, they also show a consistent thread of 
policy rationality. All in all, even though the policy measures involves certain attempts to question car-
based mobility (at least in the 1970s, 1980s and, to some extent, in the congestion tax trial), there is in the 
end no radical confrontation of private motorism. The consistent rationality is thus one of fundamental 
ambivalence about the car, but still – in the end – a strong(er) support for its strong position as an urban 
travel mode.  
The analysis also illustrates how measures like congestion taxation as an instrument might be framed and 
reframed to produce dramatically different possible mobility interventions. In Stockholm, the framing of 
future mobility changed between the congestion tax trial and the adoption of the final scheme. The 
decision 2002 to implement the trial was as a moment where the car was challenged to some extent – at 
least in the early political discussions – but in the end, the trial was still not designed to radically confront 
car based mobility. Still however, the Stockholm congestion tax has in several ways meant a radical shift 
for mobility management in Sweden as well as in other countries, not the least by showing the potential to 
not only reduce congestion but also win public support for such measures. But – as shown in this analysis 
– the result is in itself ambiguous. In essence, the “success story” of the Stockholm congestion tax trial can 
also be interpreted as a policy process that eventually allowed for a new car oriented mobility regime to 
slip into place under the veil of a progressive policy intervention (c.f. Isaksson and Richardson 2008).  
This is also a direct input to the ongoing international debate about congestion charging, where some 
writers recently have defined it as a sustainable transportation policy measure (c.f Banister 2008). The 
result of this analysis gives input to question simplistic attitudes towards congestion charging as 
essentially sustainable. The current congestion tax in Stockholm is a clear example showing that reducing 
congestion might very well be part of policy schemes that support, rather than challenge car-based 
mobility. Congestion taxes and congestion charging might very well be measures to support a 
transformation to other, less unsustainable mobilities, but not necessarily and certainly not automatically. 
It all depends on what power relations and what frames of mobility that is built into each specific scheme 
for mobility management. 
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